

**United Nations**  
**Department of Peacekeeping Operations**  
**Department of Field Support**



**Ref. 201614**

## **Guidelines**

---

# **Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Threat Mitigation in Mission Settings**

---

Approved by: USG DPKO  
USG DFS  
Effective date: 1 May 2016  
Contact: United Nations Mine Action Service, [mineaction@un.org](mailto:mineaction@un.org)  
Review date: 31 December 2018

---

**DPKO-DFS Guidelines  
On  
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Threat Mitigation in Mission Settings**

---

<b>Contents:</b>	<b>A. Purpose</b>
	<b>B. Scope</b>
	<b>C. Rationale</b>
	<b>D. Guidelines</b>
	<b>E. Headquarters and Mission-level Stakeholders</b>
	<b>F. Terms and definitions</b>
	<b>G. References</b>
	<b>H. Monitoring and compliance</b>
	<b>I. Contact</b>
	<b>J. History</b>
	<b>K. Annexes</b>

---

## **A. PURPOSE**

1. The purpose of these Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS) Guidelines on Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Threat Mitigation in Mission Settings (hereafter referred to as 'Guidelines') is to provide practitioners with a generic set of planning and coordination considerations for IED threat mitigation within the context of United Nations peace operations.
  2. Implementation of these Guidelines is intended to aid in the development of a coherent response by United Nations peace operations to reduce the impact of IEDs on United Nations personnel and assets, thereby enhancing the ability of the United Nations to deliver on mission mandates.
  3. These Guidelines may also serve as a reference tool for personnel deployed in non-mission settings.
  4. While threat mitigation activities are a component of counter-IED (C-IED), current comprehensive C-IED approaches are often based on a strategy consisting of three pillars commonly known as: preparing the force, defeating the device and attacking the network. These Guidelines focus on United Nations threat mitigation activities related to force protection, mobility, and the safety and security of personnel. These Guidelines are not intended to outline operational tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), or to provide guidance on the development of a comprehensive C-IED response.
- 

## **B. SCOPE**

5. These Guidelines are applicable to all civilian staff and uniformed personnel deployed to United Nations peacekeeping missions where IEDs pose, or could pose, a threat to the mission environment.
6. Staffs in special political missions are encouraged to use these Guidelines for reference, and to adapt them to their respective mission's structure and capacity.

## UNCLASSIFIED

7. These Guidelines are also applicable where United Nations presence is mandated to provide mission support for regional peace operations (e.g. African Union; African Union Mission to Somalia [AMISOM], United Nations Support Office in Somalia [UNSOS]) as well as in non-mission settings where United Nations personnel are deployed.
  8. These Guidelines serve as a resource for staff<sup>1</sup>, particularly those involved in planning and coordination, to take into consideration at the strategic and operational levels throughout the mission life-cycle.
  9. These Guidelines provide the basis for the future development of manuals, standard operating procedures and training materials related to IED threat mitigation.
  10. Application of these Guidelines will vary within the mission environment based on mandate, size, composition and resources as well as the threat mitigation response required. Missions shall develop internal IED threat mitigation Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) consistent with these Guidelines.
  11. These Guidelines comply with, and complement, existing policies of the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) Security Policy Manual<sup>2</sup>.
- 

### C. RATIONALE

12. Increasingly, IEDs have had a lethal impact on United Nations peace operations, political processes and humanitarian interventions.
  13. When operating in high risk environments impacted by IEDs, it is imperative that the United Nations takes concrete steps to enhance the safety and security of mission personnel, including force protection, and to ensure mobility in support of effective and safe delivery of mission mandates.
  14. United Nations Member States noted the impact of IEDs during the 70<sup>th</sup> session of the General Assembly through the adoption of two resolutions. On 7 December 2015 the General Assembly adopted a resolution on Countering the Threat Posed by IEDs (A/70/46) whereby Member States express concern over IED attacks on United Nations personnel and the impact these attacks have on freedom of movement and the ability to deliver on mandates<sup>3</sup>. On 9 December 2015, the General Assembly adopted the resolution on Assistance in Mine Action (A/70/80) which recognized the humanitarian threat posed by IEDs in post-conflict situations<sup>4</sup>.
  15. These Guidelines respond to the increasing threat posed by IEDs to United Nations personnel and assets, to the need identified at mission level to develop an effective IED threat mitigation response, and to concerns expressed by Member States.
- 

<sup>1</sup> Relevant staff may include Heads of Mission (HoM), Chiefs of Staff, heads of mission components, planners both in mission and within DPKO/DFS and DPA as well as relevant departmental and inter-agency task forces at United Nations Headquarters.

<sup>2</sup> Chapter IV, Section Y on Improvised Explosive Devices and Chapter IV, Section E on Security of United Nations Premises of the UNSMS Policy apply only to United Nations civilian staff. It should be noted that the UNSMS remains applicable in cases where civilian staff and uniformed personnel are co-located in mission premises.

<sup>3</sup> A/70/46 preambular paragraph 2

<sup>4</sup> A/70/80 preambular paragraph 7



## **D. GUIDELINES**

### **D.1 General Principles**

16. The United Nations mitigates the threat of IEDs through activities designed to enhance the safety and security of personnel, assets and facilities and to enhance mobility of United Nations personnel, both of which support mandate implementation and are within the Organization's right to self-defence.
17. All activities to mitigate the threat of IEDs should be fully integrated at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, both within the mission and the United Nations headquarters.
18. Mitigating the threat of IEDs within United Nations peace operations should not be confined to any single entity or implementation phase.
19. To facilitate matching IED threat mitigation expertise with mission planning and coordination processes, these Guidelines embed IED threat mitigation responses within relevant assessment and decision-making frameworks – to build unity of effort – and to codify measures and resources available to the United Nations.

### **D.2 IED Threat Mitigation in Mission Life-Cycle**

20. These Guidelines elaborate on measures available to the United Nations to assess, plan and carry out IED threat mitigation responses within the life-cycle of a mission.
21. IED threat mitigation should be viewed in all phases of the mission life-cycle, which includes:
  - Assessments and mission planning, including mission concept development
  - Mission start-up
  - Mandate implementation
  - Transition or drawdown
22. Key entry points where consideration of IED threat mitigation is vital include the following:
  - Assessments and planning
  - Training(pre-deployment and in-mission)
  - Acquisition of equipment
  - Identification of uniformed capabilities
  - Infrastructure design, development, and vulnerability assessments<sup>5</sup>
  - Coordination (internal and external)
  - Information management
23. The roles and responsibilities of various United Nations stakeholders associated with these key entry points are outlined in Section E, Table 1.

#### Assessments and Planning

24. During the conduct of a Strategic Assessment<sup>6</sup> the possible threat of IEDs, or other explosive hazards should be taken into account. Accordingly, assessment and planning processes should integrate expertise on explosive threat mitigation, when and where warranted.

---

<sup>5</sup> See UNSMS Policy on Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS).

<sup>6</sup> See United Nations Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning (IAP).

## UNCLASSIFIED

25. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) maintains the technical expertise required to assess the threat and potential impact of IEDs and other explosive hazards. This expertise is available at United Nations headquarters and in field missions and should be called upon to participate, support, or advise during assessment and planning processes, which may include the conduct of an assessment mission and/or technical survey.
26. Consideration should be given throughout all mission planning processes to identify specific resources (materiel, personnel, etc.) required for effective IED threat mitigation measures. Findings related to threats posed by IEDs noted in the Strategic Assessments and other assessments should inform the development of the overall mission concept and, where applicable, be incorporated as part of the budget development processes, as well as the military, police and support concepts and plans. Material and equipment needs should be addressed through the Chief of Mission Support (CMS) and/or Director of Mission Support (DMS) in relation to budget preparation. IED mitigation requirements should also be noted in the Statement of Unit Requirement (SUR)/Force Requirement (FR) documents. Annex B includes examples of IED threat mitigation capabilities that could be considered as part of mission planning and concept of operation development.
27. Deploying Troop and Police Contributing Countries (T/PCCs) should be informed of IED threats within the mission area during reconnaissance visits, in line with the DPKO Policy on Contributing Country Reconnaissance Visits (ref. 2005.6). Information on existing IED threats can aid T/PCCs in their ability to prepare threat mitigation measures. The process of assessing IED threat mitigation preparedness should be continuous. United Nations headquarters should ascertain TCC and PCC preparedness during pre-deployment visits in advance of each contingent's induction, in line with the Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement Policy (ORA Policy ref.2015.16/UN DPKO/DFS/01 Jan 2016).

### Training

28. All United Nations staff, including civilian and individual military and police personnel, deployed in missions facing an IED threat should undertake training in basic IED information and awareness, preferably as part of the induction process. Two IED awareness training modules are available for United Nations staff: the Safe and Secure Approaches in Field Environments (SSAFE) training provided by the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) and the Online Safety Training on Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War<sup>7</sup> provided by UNMAS. Examples of IED Awareness material are included in Annex D.
29. In accordance with the DPKO/DFS Policy on Training for All United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel, and under General Assembly resolution A/49/37, Member States bear the responsibility for the pre-deployment training of all military and police contingents provided to United Nations peacekeeping operations. Member States should include IED awareness modules as part of pre-deployment training. Given that the use of IEDs continues to expand globally, maintaining IED awareness is important whether the threat is present or not within a specific mission at the time of deployment.
30. The Integrated Mission Training Centre (IMTC) should serve as a resource and coordinating office on additional mission-specific training for contingents as requirements arise, depending on the operating environment. Where T/PCCs are deployed in mission settings with an IED threat, they should ensure coordination with the IMTCs for necessary additional training requirements.

---

<sup>7</sup> Handbook is available in English - [http://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/Handbook\\_English.pdf](http://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/Handbook_English.pdf), French - [http://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/Handbook\\_French.pdf](http://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/Handbook_French.pdf), and Arabic - [http://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/Handbook\\_Arabic.pdf](http://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/publications/Handbook_Arabic.pdf)



## UNCLASSIFIED

### Acquisition of Equipment

31. Planning for, budgeting and the acquisition of equipment and services required for mitigating the IED threat should be undertaken in a realistic and timely manner.
32. For mission-identified requirements related to IED threat mitigation, the respective mission support manager<sup>8</sup> could approach the United Nations Global Service Centre (GSC) in Brindisi to identify solutions, sourcing and global availability of relevant equipment or services. Future additions to the Strategic Deployment Stocks held in the GSC should take IED threat mitigation into consideration.

### Identification of Uniformed Capabilities

33. The identification of uniformed capabilities will follow the United Nations military standards as outlined in the Military Unit Manual series. Statements of Unit Requirements (SURs) should include language on what areas of IED threat mitigation are required by a particular unit.

### Infrastructure design, development, and vulnerability assessments

34. If an IED threat exists, it should be reviewed through the Security Risk Management process with a view to identifying appropriate risk management measures.
35. Mission facilities and installations occupied by civilian staff should be designed and constructed in accordance with the country-specific Minimum Operating Safety Standards (MOSS).
36. T/PCCs, in conjunction with DFS Mission Support, are responsible for the construction and security of their bases and should include IED threat mitigation measures. Of note, if civilian staff, or other staff covered by United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS), are collocated within contingent bases, MOSS is applicable. Therefore a footprint within the base must be established that is compliant with MOSS.

### Coordination (internal and external)

37. Where IEDs do or could pose a threat to United Nations operations, a mission-level IED threat mitigation strategy should be developed by senior mission management in coordination with key stakeholders.
38. In support of developing and implementing a mission-level IED threat mitigation strategy, the Head of Mission (HoM) shall establish an IED Threat Mitigation Working Group (WG) chaired by either the HoM or a designated senior member of mission leadership<sup>9</sup> to bring together all relevant stakeholders<sup>10</sup>.
39. As per Figure 1 below, the WG will direct, focus and manage IED threat mitigation efforts within the mission. The WG should gather inputs for discussion and assessment, develop IED threat mitigation outputs, and submit recommendations for decision to the HoM and the Senior Management Team.
40. The composition of the WG may vary depending on the size, available resources and level of threat within the mission environment.

---


<sup>8</sup> For example, Transport, ICTD, Supply, Engineering, Medical.

<sup>9</sup> For example, the Force Deputy Commander, Force Chief of Staff, Chief Security Advisor, head of substantive component.

<sup>10</sup> An indicative list is included in Figure 1.

# UNCLASSIFIED

41. Coordination with United Nations country team (UNCT) representatives is advisable in terms of information-sharing, particularly where the mission supports humanitarian actors in delivering their mandates. Given its mandate to engage in both humanitarian responses and peace operations, UNMAS may be called upon to liaise and coordinate with UNCT partners. Where UNMAS is not present, the UNCT may be approached to designate a coordination focal point.



**\*Indicative list of participants may include the following:**

- |                           |                          |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| - Force HQ Staff (U2/3/8) | - UNMAS                  |
| - EOD Advisor             | - POC Advisor            |
| - Police                  | - UNDSS/Security Advisor |
| - Mission Support         | - Political              |
| - JMAC                    |                          |

Figure 1: Participants and Work Flow for an IED Threat Mitigation Working Group

42. As information is gathered and assessed, WG members will develop outputs resulting in recommendations for the HoM on what threat mitigation activities should be undertaken. If approved, the recommendations should be disseminated and implemented across the mission. The WG should continue to monitor and collect feedback on the activities undertaken.
43. The WG should decide the frequency with which this information flow cycle should take place (e.g., weekly, monthly) based on the level of threat and frequency of incidents. The WG might consider the development of criteria for scheduling *ad hoc* meetings related to significant events or as the need arises.
44. Figure 2 below provides a generic information loop, for reference in the collection of IED-related information in support of WG processes.



## UNCLASSIFIED




Figure 2: IED-related information flow

### Information management

45. Missions should ensure the use of a standardized process for recording, collecting, analysing and disseminating IED incident data. Annex C includes an example of a template for reporting on incidents involving explosive hazards.
46. Data collection processes should be tailored according to mission requirements for potential use by, where relevant, the IED Threat Mitigation Working Group, the Joint Operations Centres (JOCs) and Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs) along with Force Headquarters staff.

## E. HEADQUARTERS AND MISSION-LEVEL STAKEHOLDERS

47. The table below provides a consolidated but not exhaustive list of United Nations stakeholders both at the headquarters and mission level who can be called upon when planning and coordinating efforts related to IED threat mitigation.

Planning and Coordination Considerations	United Nations Stakeholders
<b>Assessments and Planning</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs) in the relevant Regional Divisions of DPKO Office of Operations</li> <li>- Department of Field Support (DFS) Divisions</li> <li>- Office of Military Affairs (OMA),</li> <li>- Relevant Regional Divisions of Department of Political Affairs (DPA)</li> <li>- Integrated Task Force (ITF)</li> <li>- Inter-agency Task Force (IATF)</li> <li>- United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)</li> <li>- Police Division (PD)</li> </ul>
<b>Equipment</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- OMA,</li> <li>- PD</li> <li>- Department of Field Support (DFS)</li> <li>- UNMAS</li> </ul>



## UNCLASSIFIED

<b>Training</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Integrated Training Service (ITS),</li> <li>- Integrated Mission Training Centres (at mission level)</li> <li>- UNMAS</li> <li>- Special Political Mission (SPM) Training Unit or Training Focal Point</li> <li>- DPA Policy and Mediation Division</li> <li>- UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)</li> <li>- OMA</li> <li>- PD</li> </ul>
<b>Infrastructure design, development, and vulnerability assessment</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- UNMAS</li> <li>- DFS (Engineering)</li> <li>- UNDSS</li> </ul>
<b>Coordination</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- United Nations Country Teams</li> <li>- IED Threat Mitigation Working Group (mission level)</li> <li>- Mission HQ</li> </ul>
<b>Information management: reporting, data management and analysis</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- United Nations Operations Crisis Centre (UNOCC)</li> <li>- Joint Operations Centre (JOC)</li> <li>- Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) or related analysis cells</li> <li>- Force HQ</li> <li>- Police HQ</li> <li>- IED Threat Mitigation Working Group (mission level)</li> </ul>

Table1: Headquarters and Mission-Level Stakeholders

---

## F. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

48. For the purpose of these Guidelines, the terms listed below have been defined as follows:

**Improvised explosive device (IED):** An explosive device fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals and designed to kill, injure, damage, harass or distract. IEDs are often made from commercially available products or military munitions, ranging from simple to complex in design and are usually inexpensive and require little labour to produce.

**IED Threat Mitigation:** The application of physical, procedural and training measures intended to reduce the impact of an IED incident.

49. Additional terms and definitions can be found in the Glossary found in Annex A.

---

## G. REFERENCES

### General Assembly-related

Resolution on Countering the Threat Posed by IEDs (A/70/46)

Resolution on Assistance in Mine Action (A/70/80)

---

## UNCLASSIFIED

### **International Standards-related**

International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG)

International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)

### **United Nations DPKO/DFS Policy and Doctrine**

United Nations Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning (2013)

DPKO/DFS Policy on Training for All United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel (2010.20)

DPKO Policy on Pre-Deployment Visits (2005.3) –*under review*

DPKO SOP on Pre-Deployment Visits (2005.4) –*under review*

DPKO Policy on Contributing Country Reconnaissance Visits (2005.6) – *under review*

Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement Policy (ORA Policy ref.2015.16/UN DPKO/DFS/01 Jan 2016)

United Nations Military Unit Manuals (UNMUM) series related to: Special Forces, Signals, Maritime, Aviation, Logistics, Engineers, Military Police, Reconnaissance and Force Headquarters.

### **United Nations Peacekeeping and Peace Operations-related**

Report of the Secretary-General on the Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the recommendations of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (A/70/357-S/2015/682)

Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (2015)

Report of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping (2015)

### **United Nations Safety and Security-related**

United Nations Security Management System *Security Policy Manual*, Chapter III, "Applicability of United Nations Security Management System"

United Nations Security Management System *Security Policy Manual*, Chapter IV, Section Y, "Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)"

United Nations Security Management System *Security Policy Manual*, Chapter IV, Section E, Security of United Nations Premises

Landmines, Explosive Remnants of War and Improvised Explosive Device Safety Handbook

---

## **H. MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE**

50. Within peacekeeping operations and special political missions, the Head of Mission, or designated individual with delegated authority, should be responsible for the monitoring and implementation of these Guidelines. At United Nations headquarters, monitoring compliance with these Guidelines should be overseen by relevant departments and units.



---

## I. CONTACTS

51. This document was developed through an extensive consultative process involving an inter-departmental working group led by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). The working group included representatives from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) from the Office of Operations (OO) and Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs), the Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training (DPET), and the Police Division (PD) plus representatives from the Department of Field Support (DFS), the Department of Safety and Security (DSS), and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). Peacekeeping and special political missions were also consulted and inputs received from 20 missions. Queries or comments should be directed to UNMAS ([mineaction@un.org](mailto:mineaction@un.org)).

---

## J. HISTORY

52. This is the first issuance of these Guidelines. In line with the DPKO/DFS Policy on Guidance Development, the Guidelines should be reviewed no later than two years after the effective date on the first page of this document.

---

## K. ANNEXES

Annex A: Glossary

Annex B: Examples of IED Threat Mitigation Capabilities

Annex C: Example of IED Incident Reporting Template

Annex D: Example of IED Awareness Material

APPROVAL SIGNATURE



USG DPKO

Date MAY 05 2016

APPROVAL SIGNATURE



USG DFS

Date APR 29 2016

## UNCLASSIFIED

### Annex A: Glossary

**Command wire IED (CWIED):** A switch where the firing point and the contact point are separate but joined together by a length of wire.

**Counter-IED (C-IED):** The comprehensive, strategic approach to responding to the threat and use of IEDs. It represents the collective efforts at strategic, operational and tactical levels to defeat the improvised explosive device network.

**Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD):** The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery and disposal of explosive ordnance, including IEDs.

**Explosively-formed projectile (EFP):** A main charge configuration incorporating an explosive charge with a concave metal liner which by the force of the charge reshapes the liner into a high velocity metal slug capable of penetrating armour.

**Homemade explosive (HME):** Non-standard explosive mixtures or compounds that have been formulated or synthesized from available ingredients (e.g., fertilizer and fuel).

**Improvised explosive device (IED):** An explosive device fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals and designed to kill, injure, damage, harass or distract. IEDs are often made from commercially available products and/or military munitions, ranging from simple to complex in design and are usually inexpensive and require little labour to produce.

**Improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD):** Refers to locating, identifying, rendering safe and disposing of IEDs, using specialized IEDD procedures and equipment by qualified specialists.

**Improvised Explosive Device Threat Mitigation:** Physical, procedural and training measures intended to reduce the impact of an IED incident.

**Large Vehicle-borne IED (LVBIED):** An IED built into any large ground-based vehicle (e.g., dump truck, panel truck, bongo truck, commercial bus, tanker, etc.) which serves as the concealment and delivery means for explosives with an initiating device. A LVBIED vehicle may be also (up)armoured to force entry, prevent interception and increase fragmentation effect.

**Operational IED:** An IED that has not been officially declared a remnant IED (in line with the UN SMS Policy).

**Person-borne IED (PBIED):** An IED worn, carried or housed by a person, either willing or unwillingly, and triggered by the individual or remotely.

**Radio-controlled IED (RCIED):** A switch initiated electronically by wireless means consisting of a transmitter and receiver.

**Remnant IED:** An IED that has been declared so by the Designated Official in accordance with the United Nations Security Management System policy and procedures, involving the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator, in consultation with the United Nations Country Team and mine action advice, if necessary. Such decision making process will consider the political, humanitarian, legal and other issues of the context in which the IEDs are found.

**Vehicle-borne IED (VBIED):** An IED delivered by or concealed in a ground-based vehicle.



## UNCLASSIFIED

**Victim-operated IED (VOIED):** A type of switch that is activated by an unsuspecting individual, relying on the intended target to carry out some form of action that will cause it to function.

**Weapons Intelligence:** Intelligence derived from the process and capabilities that collect and analyze threat weapons systems to enable material sourcing, support to prosecution, force protection and targeting of threat networks.

## Annex B: Examples of IED Threat Mitigation Capabilities

The table below provides examples of capabilities that can be requested by mission planners in support of IED threat mitigation measures. This list is not exhaustive and the capacity to fulfill each function may vary and should be tailored according to the needs of the mission.

Capability	Function
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)	Specialized teams trained in the detection, identification, evaluation, render safe, recovery and disposal of explosive ordnance, including IEDs.
Search Teams	Specialized search teams used in the detection of IEDs, often used alongside EOD teams.
Explosive Detection Dogs (EDD)	Consists of the handler and dog specifically trained in the detection of explosives.
Route Clearance Patrols (RCP)	Specially equipped teams with the equipment designed to aid in identifying IEDs and explosives hazards along routes of travel within the mission area.
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities	Specialized equipment and techniques for increasing the mission's situational awareness related to IED use.
Weapons Intelligence Teams (WIT) (also referred to as Weapons Exploitation Teams (WET) or Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI))	Specialized teams that conduct post incident investigation and collect forensic data.
Electronic Counter Measures (ECM)	Equipment designed for use against the threat of Remote Controlled IEDs (RCIED).




## Annex C: Example of Reporting Template

Below is an example of the standard 9-line reporting template, which can be used as a model for developing a standard reporting format specific to any mission context.


# REPORTING AN EO/IED

**INFORM YOUR SUPERIORS THROUGH  
THE CHAIN OF COMMAND**



<b>A</b>	Priority for requesting unit		Immediate <input type="checkbox"/> urgent <input type="checkbox"/> routine <input type="checkbox"/> no threat <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>B</b>	Incident reported by	1	Rank or position
		2	Contact name
		3	Unit identifier/Call sign
		4	Contact method
<b>C</b>	POC for further information	1	Rank or position
		2	Contact name
		3	Unit identifier/Call sign
		4	Contact method
		5	Rendezvous location for EOR/ EOD team
<b>D</b>	DTG of EO/IED discovery		EO/IED was discovered
<b>E</b>	Location / area of EO/IED	1	Grid reference
		2	Additional location info
		3	Under water <span style="float: right;">Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/></span>
		4	Buried <span style="float: right;">Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/></span>
<b>F</b>	EO identification estimate		What? How many? (use ID Guide codes)
<b>G</b>	Safety measures undertaken	1	Evacuation distance in meter
		2	Other protective measures taken
<b>H</b>	Effect on operation		Totally disrupted <input type="checkbox"/> major <input type="checkbox"/> minor <input type="checkbox"/> nil <input type="checkbox"/>
<b>I</b>	Other significant info		
<b>J</b>	Date and signature		

NEVER



- TOUCH, MOVE OR DISTURB THE EO/IED
- USE A MOBILE PHONE OR RADIO WITHIN 50 M OF THE EO/IED
- ALLOW **ANYONE** TO RE-ENTER THE CORDON
- GIVE INFORMATION TO CIVILIANS OR TO THE MEDIA

Source: Landmines, Explosive Remnants of War, and IED Safety Handbook, 2015 edition, UNMAS

# UNMAS

## EVACUATION DISTANCE GUIDE

### THREATS

### EXPLOSIVE WEIGHT THE EQUIVALENT\*

### MINIMUM EVACUATION DISTANCE BEHIND WALL\*\*

### RECOMMENDED EVACUATION DISTANCE IN THE OPEN\*\*\*

PIPE  
BOMB

2.3 kg  
5 lbs

130 m  
427 ft

366 m  
1,200 ft

SUICIDE  
BOMBER

9 kg  
20 lbs

150 m  
493 ft

518 m  
1,700 ft

BRIEFCASE/  
BACKPACK

23 kg  
50 lbs

185 m  
607 ft

564 m  
1,850 ft

COMPACT  
CAR

227 kg  
500 lbs

270 m  
866 ft

580 m  
1,900 ft

FULL SIZE  
CAR

407 kg  
1,000 lbs

300 m  
985 ft

732 m  
2,400 ft

VAN/  
SUV

1,814 kg  
4,000 lbs

375 m  
1,231 ft

1,150 m  
3,800 ft

SMALL TRUCK/  
MOVING VAN

4,536 kg  
10,000 lbs

440 m  
1,444 ft

1,555 m  
5,100 ft

WATER  
TANKER

13,608 kg  
30,000 lbs

525 m  
1,723 ft

2,408 m  
7,900 ft

SEMI-  
TRAILER

27,236 kg  
60,000 lbs

570 m  
1,870 ft

2,845 m  
9,300 ft

\* Conversion based on  
Department of Defense  
guidance. Actual weight may vary.  
See [www.dod.mil/pentagon](http://www.dod.mil/pentagon)  
for more information.

\*\* This distance does not take into account factors such as  
ground surface, wind direction, type of building, etc.  
Always consult your local emergency management  
authorities for more information.

\*\*\* Distance shown here is based  
on Department of Defense  
guidance. See [www.dod.mil/pentagon](http://www.dod.mil/pentagon)  
for more information.

© 2007 UNMAS. All rights reserved. Reproduction of this document  
without written permission from UNMAS is prohibited.

UNMAS.ORG

# BEWARE IED THREATS

# WATCH FOR IED COMPONENTS

# IED ENVIRONMENT AWARENESS

**LOOK FOR GROUND SIGNS**  
e.g., disturbed earth,  
suspicious markings

**VARY TRAVEL ROUTES**  
Avoid setting patterns

**DRIVE CAREFULLY**  
Pay attention at slow  
down points (e.g.,  
sharp corners, bridges,  
bottlenecks)

**REMAIN ALERT**  
Prepare for blast waves,  
wear seat belts and secure  
baggage

**HAS THE ENVIRONMENT  
CHANGED?**  
Be aware of unusual population behavior,  
such as locations that were  
once active and are now abandoned

**DON'T PICK  
SOMETHING UP  
IF YOU DIDN'T  
PUT IT THERE**

To learn more, download the  
UNMAS (Landmine + ERW) Safety  
app and visit us online at:  
**UNMAS.ORG**