



UNderstanding IEDs

UNMAS Efforts in Somalia to prevent
and counter the use of IEDs

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UNMAS Somalia Explosive Hazard Management

IED threat mitigation challenges



Somalia


IED Threat Analysis

- IED Threat Evolution – 5 years
- Current IED Threat

Slido Question 5



Slido Question 6




Possible Blast Damage - VBIED 1100kg TNT Times Square NYC




Based on the UN Safeguard Explosion Consequence Analysis (ECA)
1100kg TNT equivalence – hemispherical blast effects

IED THREAT OVERVIEW: 2013 – 2018




Fast Facts

- Al Shabaab primary aggressor. Focus on IED attacks since 2013.
- At least 1 757 IED Incidents
- 419 IED dismantled/discovered
- Supply Routes & Mogadishu primarily targeted
- Increase IEDs near urban areas
- At least 1 473 roadside IEDs
- 157 vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIED)
- 128 under-vehicle IEDs (UVIED)
- 26 suicide bomber attacks (PBIED)
- **IED numbers have consistently increased since 2013, with a notable spike since the third quarter of 2015.**



Threat Areas & MSR Geographic Spread - 2018

- Main supply routes (MSRs) and key MSR segments in the outskirts of strategic crossroads – Afgooye, Marka, Kismayo, Baidoa, Mogadishu are the primary target areas.
- **Mogadishu concentrates most of the UV/VBIED detonations due to the status of the city as centre of the government.**
- Al Shabaab retain considerable freedoms of action and movement across the AOR, enabling the relatively rapid deployment of IEDs to counter security offensives.
- This was most recently highlighted by the route clearance operation launched in Sector 4.



UNMAS

Support to AMISOM

- Training and Mentorship
- Equipment Support



Training & Mentorship Activities






Equipment Support


Trendline IED Incidents v's AMISOM Casualty Rate 2015-2018

Trained

Casualties





AMISOM Trained AMISOM CASUALTIES Linear (AMISOM CASUALTIES) Linear (IED INCIDENTS)



Lessons: Need for a Broader Approach

- Increase in IEDs and Civilian Casualties
- Active Conflict Environment – Why is DtN important?
- What Does Degrading the Network (DtN) Look Like within UNMAS?

Civilian Casualties by IEDs: 2013 - 2018



Active Conflict – Why is DtN Important?

Degrade the Network

Predict

Prevent



UNMAS
IED Threat
Analysis &
Collaboration


Defeat the Device

Detect

Neutralize

Mitigate

Exploit



Prepare the Force

IEDD TTPs

Training

Equipment




Slido Question 7



Degrading the Network

- IED network is largely Somalia-based.
- Long-term smuggling networks with Yemen provide sustainable illegal supply routes for components not available in Somalia.
- Harvesting of ERW and captures of FGS/AMISOM FOBs has provided a robust source of explosives.
- Al Shabaab have access to significant financial flows



Degrading the Network: Reducing ERW



Eel-Gula



Galkayo



Beledweyne



Berdale



Adado



Luuq




Eel-Barde



Baidoa ammo bunker

Degrading the Network – Supply Chain



Technical Exploitation in Somalia

Level 1



Field Exploitation

Level 2



National Laboratory
Exploitation

Level 3



Detailed Scientific
Exploitation