In August 2016, the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in cooperation with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), implemented a national Weapons and Ammunition (WAM) baseline assessment in the DRC. Led by national authorities, in particular the National Commission for Small Arms and Light Weapons Control and Armed Violence Reduction (CNC-APLC), the objectives of this round of consultations were to establish a baseline of existing WAM activities and procedures in place, to identify areas to be strengthened, and to present recommendations for policy and programmatic responses to build a national framework governing the management of arms and ammunition.

The national consultation offered the opportunity for representatives, experts and practitioners from various institutions and security agencies within the DRC to engage in dialogue, build trust, and improve needed cooperation between them to design and implement a strong national WAM framework. The exchanges and information provided in the course of the national consultation, bilateral meetings with senior representatives of relevant national institutions with WAM oversight, were consolidated into a report and shared with the Government of the DRC to support its efforts in improving its national weapons and ammunition framework.

This publication is an extract of the baseline assessment report delivered to the national authorities of the DRC. It is a snapshot of the summary of the main findings and options identified for the enhancement of weapons and ammunition management in the DRC.

It presents the status of strategic and operational WAM efforts in the DRC as identified during the baseline assessment in August 2016 and highlights the practical recommendations provided to the authorities of the DRC.
**KEY STAKEHOLDERS**

| National Commission for Small Arms and Light Weapons Control and Armed Violence Reduction | CNC-APLC |
| Ministry of Interior and Security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo | MoIS |
| Democratic Republic of the Congo Ministry of Defence | MoD |
| United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo | MONUSCO |
| United Nations Mine Action Service | UNMAS |
| Maison Militaire du Chef de l’Etat | The President’s Military House |
| | European Union Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo | EUSEC |
| | Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States | RECSA |
| | Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo | FARDC |
| | Congolese Institute for the Conservation of Nature | ICCN |
| | Directorate-General of Migration | DGM |
| | Congolese National Police | PNC |

**METHODOLOGY**

UNIDIR defines WAM in a comprehensive manner covering the oversight, accountability and governance of arms and ammunition throughout their management cycle, including the establishment of relevant national frameworks, processes and practices for the safe and secure production and acquisition of materiel, stockpiling, transfers, end use control, tracing and disposal.

This holistic approach is essential in ensuring that efforts to better regulate arms and ammunition are undertaken in alignment with broader security sector, rule of law, armed violence reduction, counter-terrorism, and peacebuilding processes, and not in isolation. **Research emphasis is placed on national and regional approaches to WAM in pursuit of a national and regionally owned process, and to support a ‘bottom-up’ and evidence-based approach.**

This Country Insight on the DRC is part of a series of Country Insights that seek to promote knowledge and raise visibility and awareness on the WAM context, progress made, and areas for enhancement in the African States that have conducted WAM baseline assessments with support from UNIDIR. The series is aimed to serve as a reference for international partners for providing assistance and technical support for improving weapons and ammunition frameworks in the relevant country.

**Information contained in this Country Insight presents key findings and recommendations of the baseline assessment conducted in August 2016. It does not reflect the progress made or any changes implemented after the assessment and should be taken to be indicative only of the situation at the time of the assessment.**

Building on the multi-year WAM baseline assessments in Africa, UNIDIR, in partnership with the African Union (AU) Commission and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Commission, aims to enhance knowledge and dialogue among States, regional organizations, the United Nations and expert Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) on good practices and lessons learned, as well as on the means and methods to further strengthen national and regional approaches to WAM in Africa.

**NATIONAL CONTEXT**

Emerging from successive conflicts, the Government of the DRC is showing encouraging signs of rebuilding its institutional capacity and positively engaging in initiatives aimed at combating the uncontrolled proliferation of arms and ammunition within its national territory. Nevertheless, vulnerabilities in some of the national controls on state-owned weapons and ammunition, as well as the availability of illicit supply routes for non-state actors, remain as substantial obstacles. Indeed, these two challenges are interconnected as the uncontrolled proliferation and diversion of arms continue to fuel armed violence and incidents mostly in the eastern region, and pose a threat to sustainable stabilization and development in the country.

Recognizing these challenges, the DRC—together with international partners, including MONUSCO, UNMAS, the European Union Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC), and other bilateral partners—began to invest considerable resources to improving the accountability and governance over national stocks throughout the various stages in the arms and ammunition management lifecycle. Consolidating relevant positive outcomes and building on such efforts should be a priority for the DRC not only to ensure stability and peaceful development, but also to prepare the requisite conditions for the possible lifting of the international sanctions regime, which has been in place since December 2016.
With the conclusion of the 2011–2016 National Action Plan on small arms and light weapons (SALW), this process offered a timely opportunity to undertake a comprehensive mapping of the different pillars comprising the national normative WAM architecture, and to review the national practices and procedures applying to WAM in August 2016. The consultations focused on the WAM lifecycle, existing actors, processes, and resources, as well as areas where enhancements may be required in order to improve national regulatory frameworks, procedures and practices. Particular focus was placed on identifying and exploring options to better implement existing procedures at the various levels of governance, including in remote areas, at lower unit levels of government appendages, as well as in regions where military operations are ongoing and the mobility of the security personnel are often restricted. While recognizing that capacity and resource constraints exist in the DRC, the potential options and avenues identified by national actors during the consultations to strengthen WAM in the DRC provide a critical foundation for the CNC-ALPC and the DRC as they plan, implement, and monitor activity in the future, including the revision of the National Action Plan on SALW.

The DRC has demonstrated a sustained commitment to enhancing its national WAM framework and expressed its appreciation for the support received during the consultation process held in Kinshasa. While challenges remain, the DRC, under the leadership of CNC-ALPC, should be commended on its previous efforts to define an institutional framework for WAM and improve its implementation. Nevertheless, in August 2016, work remained if the country was to move towards alignment with relevant international and regional standards, and towards an appropriate national WAM system, particularly in terms of the concrete implementation of WAM activities at various levels of Government.

In strengthening the various pillars of WAM, further support and coordination from the international community are needed to address the numerous challenges faced by the DRC. Additionally, continuous monitoring and evaluation efforts at the national level are desirable to better identify and quantify some of needs that could be addressed by international partners.
## Overview of Options for WAM Enhancement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Short Term</th>
<th>Medium Term</th>
<th>Long Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Legal Framework</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Coordinating Mechanism</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transfer Controls</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical Security and Stockpile Management</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weapons Marking</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recordkeeping</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Processing and Tracing of Captured Weapons</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disposal and Destruction</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weapons Collection (Not Covering DDR Programme by MONUSCO)</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Relevant Thematic Areas - Awareness-raising and Studies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Number of Options: 46**
TECHNICAL PILLAR 1:
NATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK

KEY FINDINGS
- In August 2016, the legal framework vis-à-vis various aspects of WAM (both to state-owned and civilian-held) was incomplete, outdated, and not well placed to adequately respond to emerging WAM challenges in the DRC. Results from the consultative process in August 2016 suggested that the existing legal framework did not meet the standards to which the DRC had committed itself under relevant regional/global agreements, including the Nairobi Protocol and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol.
- At the time of the assessment, the DRC’s priorities were the completion of the ongoing legislative review process to revise the 1985 national law and the subsequent adoption of comprehensive legal and normative measures relevant to WAM. Such progress is critical not only for the country to implement its relevant obligations from regional and international agreements to which it is a party, but also to codify the existing procedures that were used by the security services in several operational areas. These areas include recordkeeping, marking and physical security and stockpile management (PSSM). While most of the operational aspects of PSSM are regulated through articulated standard operating procedures (SOPs) and written guidelines adopted by each relevant agency, many areas pertaining to transfer controls and firearms ownership remain severely under-regulated. Similarly, good standards were not elevated to the status of legal requirements at the time of the assessment, and their application remained a fortunate result of positive daily practices and appropriated working methods at the headquarters level.
- The absence of an adequate national legal architecture in August of 2016 represented a serious concern even if the normative vacuum was partially filled by other regulations in place, in particular Law 04-027 (Loi 04-027 du 24 novembre 2004 portant sur l’organisation générale de la défense et des forces armées) which contains provisions applying specifically to the management of the military equipment owned by the DRC Ministry of Defence (MoD). This regulation sets forth inter alia an obligation for the DRC Armed Forces (FARDC) to establish and manage a centralized register of weapons and ammunition stored under its authority. Moving forward, it would be advantageous to address the gaps in the national legal architecture in a more systematic manner, including through a national plan to operationalize the revised national law.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

1. Continue to advocate for the timely completion of the review process for the new legislation on arms
2. Adopt the legislation that was under review in August 2016
3. Review and revise existing regulations governing State-held arms and ammunition for all security forces and institution in line with newly adopted legislation

TECHNICAL PILLAR 2:
NATIONAL COORDINATING MECHANISM

KEY FINDINGS
- While there are several national actors involved in decision-making on and coordination of WAM activities in the DRC, as of August 2016 there was no single, centralized national WAM framework that governed the planning and implementation of activities at both the strategic and operational levels. Operations for the management of stockpiled arms and ammunition were implemented by the MoD, which is also a member of the Ministerial Commission of the CNC-ALPC.
- At the strategic level, the Maison Militaire du Chef de l’Etat plays a central role in national WAM planning and authorization of WAM activities. The Maison Militaire is tasked with coordinating and supervising the implementation of national strategies and policies designed for WAM including the procurement of arms and ammunition for DRC security forces. The
scope of activities and depth of oversight provided by the Maison Militaire in the area of WAM, however, remained unclear at the time of the baseline assessment in August 2016. Decision making at this level remained unclear and the consultations in August 2016 revealed that the coordination and sharing of information could be improved.

- At the operational level, the CNC-ALPC holds the most explicit mandate in terms of coordination of actions and strategies to reduce illicit SALW circulation within the country. The CNC-ALPC has played a leading role at the operational level since its establishment in May 2008. Although its scope is limited to SALW, the CNC-ALPC has conducted projects in various thematic areas of WAM, from setting up collection of illicit weapons programmes to institutional capacity-building in different domains including PSSM. Despite its efforts and the support provided from both the DRC and international partners, the CNC-ALPC suffered from limited capacity, and financial, operational, and human resources in August 2016.
- Reinforcing the CNC-ALPC’s capacity, which was already identified as one of the major objectives in the 2011–2016 National Action Plan on SALW, remains a priority and a necessary long-term investment.

**OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT**

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Enhance coordination at high-level (via the Inter-Ministerial Meeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Establish technical working groups on weapons and ammunition management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Raise awareness at high level on weapons and ammunition management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Strengthen the involvement of other bodies of the State (the Congolese Institute for the Conservation of Nature (ICCN) and the Directorate-General of Migration (DGM))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Establish a Plan of Action with measurable objectives and evaluation process prior to RevCon 3 (2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Strengthen cooperation and coordination of WAM projects supported by international partners (from design to the implementation), with a view to strengthening national ownership by the CNC-ALPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Conduct consultative meetings at the local level (provincial offices)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Establish an information-sharing mechanism between its members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Strengthen the capacity to develop project proposals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 13. | Strengthen international cooperation:  
   13.1 Participate and share result of this process at the RevCon 3 (2018) |
| 14. | Convene an evaluation consultation series in order to support the review of the national WAM mechanism |
| 15. | Strengthen the participation of women, including activities related to technical issues, by promoting the increased involvement of women in uniform |
16. Enhance the capacity of Provincial Antennas

17. Strengthen regional cooperation:
   - 17.1 Kinshasa Convention
   - 17.2 Nairobi Protocol
   - 17.3 United Nations Strategy for the Great Lakes

18. Advocate for a more systematic integration of SALW in national strategies and plans

**TECHNICAL PILLAR 3: TRANSFER CONTROLS**

**KEY FINDINGS**
- In 2008, United Nations Security Council resolution 1807 (2008) lifted the arms embargo imposed on the DRC in 2005, with Security Council resolution 1596 (2005). However, this did not imply a complete lifting of the sanctions regime. In August 2016, an arms embargo was maintained on non-state armed groups operating in the eastern DRC. Resolution 1807 established a sanctions regime which has repeatedly been renewed ever since. It also established the obligation for States exporting military equipment to the DRC to notify the Security Council Sanctions Committee of the transfer prior to delivery. Although the technical provisions established by resolution 1807 do not limit the right of the DRC to seek and procure arms and ammunition, national authorities have expressed concerns that the embargo nevertheless represents an interference with national sovereignty.
- Transfer controls are managed exclusively by the Maison Militaire. As the DRC does not manufacture military equipment, these transfer controls relate primarily to importation activities. National authorities explained that the DRC does not re-transfer materials to third States. Procurement of military equipment is carried out exclusively under the MoD’s authority, a process that is led by the FARDC. Importation of arms is conducted upon requests made by each State’s security agency based on an evaluation of need for operations. Based on the consultations, the procedure for formulating the requests for procurement appeared to be well understood by relevant security services. Upon import, weapons are delivered directly to the FARDC Base Logistique Centrale, registered at the FARDC central stockpile and then distributed to the requesting units or agency.
- Apart from the Maison Militaire and MoD, no other national authorities were involved in the national transfer control process as of August 2016. There was no legal framework which fully regulated transfer control activities such as transit, trans-shipment or brokering.
- Considering extant legal lacunae and the need for the DRC to align its domestic regulatory framework with regional and international standards (for example, the Nairobi Protocol and the Kinshasa Convention), efforts to review, adjust and adopt a robust national legal framework on transfer controls represented a priority for the DRC as of August 2016.

**OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT**

19. Consider the implications of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and the Kinshasa Convention principles at the national, strategic and operational level

20. Undertake codification of existing importation practices into procedures for relevant national entities and forces
KEY FINDINGS

- As reflected in several past reports from the United Nations Group of Experts on the DRC, diversion from national stockpiles to non-state armed groups (in particular those operating in the east) has for a long time been one of the main sources of supplies for insurrection movements, armed groups and local militias. Improving PSSM practices and procedures vis-à-vis State-owned weapons and ammunition has therefore been the focus of several recent initiatives which have culminated in the adoption of national guidelines in accordance with the Modular Small Arms Control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC), formerly known as the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS), and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATGs). These national guidelines were developed in cooperation with the EUSEC. Additionally, UNMAS and international NGOs, such as the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), have supported the DRC national security forces with several training activities on the management of stockpiles as well as the refurbishment and construction of several storage facilities throughout the country.

- Despite encouraging progress made in recent years, the consultative process of August 2016 identified stockpile management as an area which still deserves concerted attention and support. In particular, there is a need to continue training personnel to manage storage facilities in line with national guidelines and relevant SOPs, and to further improve the physical storage conditions in the more remote areas of the country (at the regional, provincial and field levels). In particular, the DRC could benefit from a PSSM prioritization plan based on risk assessments conducted for all storage sites managed by the security services across the country.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

Continue training efforts for personnel in charge of weapons and ammunition stockpile management

*Note: Training modules may address personnel with different levels of experience in order not only to respond to the lack of qualified personnel but also to propagate and scale-up the already available expertise*

The sensitization of high-level authorities on secure stockpiling of weapons and ammunition

23.1. Organize a high-level seminar on PSSM

Conduct a technical survey focused on assessing available technical capacity, as well as needs, priorities and associated risks at the national and provincial level

*Note: The data collected could serve to better design responses and facilitate the mobilization of external support*

Design and sequence a national training plan for PSSM-related matters and the establishment of a “train-the-trainers” programme

Develop simplified SOPs with a view to achieve compliance with IATG risk reduction process level 1 requirements for units deployed in remote areas, and for stores gathering only limited volumes of weapons and ammunition
Technical Pillar 5:
Weapons Marking

Key Findings

- In the 2015–2016 period, the DRC made progress in the area of weapons marking. At the time of the assessment, a marking programme for State-owned weapons was ongoing. As of the baseline assessment in August 2016, 15,452 FARDC-owned weapons were recorded as marked. These included 550 weapons that were integrated into the State’s stockpile after being collected from civilians in Bunia in 2015, and some weapons from the Service National (a reserve branch of FARDC). These weapons were marked by a team established within the FARDC Base Logistique Centrale.

- Newly marked weapons are recorded and allocated a unique marking code in line with the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA) Guidelines. This code includes a five pointed star, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) code for the country (CD for Congo Démocratique) with a two-letter acronym to identify the DRC agency (FA for the Armed Forces, PN for the National Police, etc.) and its manufacture serial number (in the case that the weapon does not have a serial number, one is marked). Data on newly marked weapons are recorded by a software programme which controls the marking kit. Copies of this database of newly marked weapons exist in hard copy at the FARDC Base Logistique Centrale, and in soft copy with MAG, the NGO partnering with FARDC for this program.

- In August 2016, there were five marking machines available in the DRC. One was reportedly unserviceable, two were used at the FARDC Base Logistique Centrale and two were kept by the CNC-ALPC, unused. These latter two were to be used in the east of the country in the marking programme’s next phase. An additional five marking machines have been procured by UNMAS. UNMAS planned to hand over these marking machines to the Government of the DRC once a national marking programme had been designed and developed by the Government.

- The operational marking process adopted by the Working Group on Marking, coordinated by the CNC-ALPC, and tested by the pilot project in Kinshasa that was in place in August 2016, appears to be elaborated to some degree. There is a need for an adequate marking framework which is validated by all relevant technical parties. Due to the limited number of marking kits available, logistical capacity and trained personnel, obstacles and challenges in this area may emerge and result in the inability to physically mark all weapons circulating in the country. Furthermore, the complex Congolese security situation (for instance, processing of weapons captured during active military operations) as well as the lack of a clear sequence for the next stages of the marking process, which were slated to begin upon conclusion of the pilot project in Kinshasa, pose substantial concerns for the DRC.

- In order to maintain the momentum built by the aforementioned pilot marking programme and to address the challenges noted above, it is important that additional technical and financial assistance be allocated to this area by international partners in the near future.

Options for WAM Enhancement

29. Resume the work of the technical working group on marking

30. Design and develop a National Marking Plan based on needs, as well as clear sequencing and timelines to measure progress
TECHNICAL PILLAR 6: 
RECORD KEEPING

KEY FINDINGS

- The national record-keeping architecture—from the Base Logistique Centrale to the smaller units in the field—appears to be adequate and aligned with internationally accepted principles. As of August 2016, further progress in the national record-keeping system was expected due to the eventual digitization of the FARDC’s central database, located at the Base Logistique Centrale.
- In practice, however, record-keeping, including the implementation of existing national SOPs in this area, was difficult at the provincial level and the more remote areas of the country in August 2016. There was often a challenge to ensure that the records at the storage site matched the actual stocks at the level of smaller units. The effective implementation of good record-keeping practices is often limited by a lack of adequate resources (i.e. a lack of suitable storage space), trained personnel, as well as frequent rotation of trained personnel. The DRC is encouraged to invest in or seek support from partners for further training initiatives on record-keeping that are designed in line with national SOPs for the provincial and lower unit levels.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

35. Comprehensively digitize the written registers into the new electronic database operated by the Base Logistique Centrale

36. Gradually establish an electronic database within the Defence Zones Command (or the equivalent level of command for agencies other than the FARDC)

37. Consolidate and disseminate existing good practices and available know-how to enhance practices at all levels of DRC security agencies
**TECHNICAL PILLAR 7: PROCESSING AND TRACING OF CAPTURED WEAPONS**

**KEY FINDINGS**

- Under DRC practices in use as of August 2016, serviceable captured and collected illicit weapons are registered and then integrated into the State-owned stockpile (i.e. into the FARDC’s existing stockpile for distribution to units or other security agencies, depending on the operational needs). However, at the time of the assessment, no systematic tracing mechanism existed for arms and ammunition captured, seized and/or collected, except when they related to a criminal investigation. All tracing activity conducted by the DRC is restricted to domestic operations. As of August 2016, there was a lack of knowledge and capacity for the DRC to effectively respond to or make requests for international tracing operations.

- During the consultative process, however, DRC actors highlighted their intention to reinforce national capacities as regards identifying and tracing weapons and ammunition through the establishment of an internal Working Group on Tracing within the CNC-ALPC. The consultative process also revealed the DRC’s interest to include identification and tracing processes in their national collection programmes in order to extrapolate trends and map illicit supply routes.

**OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT**

38. Introduce weapons profiling, identification and tracing activities within the scope of the CNC-ALPC voluntary-collection programmes

39. Reinforce local capacities in the area of weapons and ammunition profiling, identification and data-registration of captured or collected weapons

40. Establish a CNC-ALPC working group on weapons and ammunition identification and tracing in line with the commitments of the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)

41. Design and adopt codified SOPs in the area of data-collection and data-registration as it applies to collected, seized and captured weapons and ammunition

---

**TECHNICAL PILLAR 8: CIVILIAN POSSESSION AND OWNERSHIP**

**KEY FINDINGS**

- National legislation regulating the civilian ownership of weapons was under review in August 2016. Initiated in 2010, the Parliament’s adoption process has generated two different texts approved by the National Assembly in November 2010, and by the Senate in December 2013. The differences between these two texts were being reconciled by a Joint Parliamentary Commission (Commission Mixte Paritaire) at the time of the assessment. As this process was yet to conclude at the time of the baseline assessment in August 2016, the legal framework in place reflected the norms and principles from the Law of 1985, which did not adequately regulate all aspects of civilian possession and ownership of weapons.

- It is worth noting that during the consultative process, several national authorities remarked that the civilian possession of weapons in the DRC is a complex matter that cannot be regulated through a
TECHNICAL PILLAR 9: DISPOSAL AND DESTRUCTION

KEY FINDINGS

- Serviceable weapons and ammunition that are captured from operations are predominantly integrated into national stocks after being registered. Destruction programmes, on the other hand, involve obsolete or unserviceable equipment; captured weapons which are unserviceable; unstable ammunition or, in smaller volumes, captured ammunition which are incompatible with the calibre of the national security force’s equipment.
- In practice, none of the Congolese security agencies had existing procedures for the identification of surplus weapons and ammunition. According to national authorities, this is in part due to the fact that national stockpiles do not adequately meet the overall needs for military operations.
- While internal procedures for the disposal of weapons and ammunition exist for the FARDC and the PNC, the DRC faces logistical challenges in its implementation, particularly for its destruction programme. The consultative process revealed that weapons destined for destruction across the country are transported to the capital, Kinshasa, for physical destruction. Though unserviceable and/or unstable ammunition is destroyed on site, there is a limited number of trained individuals who are able to verify and conduct this destruction without the support of international partners. This practice indicates that in order for destruction activities to take place, either technical personnel from Kinshasa would need to undertake frequent travel to remote areas or weapons would need to be transported by air to Kinshasa on a regular basis. In this regard, physical security and accounting of weapons becomes an additional challenge for the DRC.
- Between 2007 and the end of July 2016, the FARDC and the PNC destroyed 177,400 weapons, a large amount of which were unserviceable or obsolete. The majority of these weapons were destroyed in Kinshasa by the personnel of the FARDC’s Base Logistique Centrale, which is responsible for the weapons’ final technical and functional verification and removal from State-owned stockpiles. Moving forward, the DRC is encouraged to further build on national technical capacity to manage destruction programmes through carrying out training, including for ammunition destruction. The DRC may also consider and re-evaluate the effectiveness and the diversion risks associated with the current model to transport all weapons to Kinshasa prior to their destruction.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

42. Underline the need to reinforce the FARDC and other relevant entities’ technical capacity in an effort to reduce delays in verification inspection missions, planning and destruction, particularly of unknown ammunition.

TECHNICAL PILLAR 10: WEAPONS COLLECTION (NOT COVERING DDR PROGRAMME BY MONUSCO)

KEY FINDINGS

- Various different collection programmes have been conducted in the DRC over the past few years, all involving different approaches (ranging from forced disarmament during military campaigns to voluntary...
hand-over activities) and actors (including national security forces, the CNC-ALPC, local civil society organizations and international partners).

- With respect to civilian and voluntary collection programmes, the CNC-ALPC has taken the lead and has conducted a number of activities in this arena. For example, in 2014 the CNC-ALPC collected approximately 650 arms from communities in the Ituri Province.

- Based on the consultative process, the methodological approach explained by the CNC-ALPC appears to be comprehensive and sensitive to various principles outlined by existing international standards, such as inclusiveness, gender-based participation and sustainable disarmament. For example, surveys and sensitization activities are conducted in target communities in advance of the operational phase; during the physical collection phase, the collection is supervised by a joint technical committee (gathering national authorities, local civil society representatives, and international partners); and temporary judiciary measures are utilized as incentives for civilians to participate in the collection programme. Once collected, weapons and ammunition are verified, marked (for weapons only) and either destroyed (if unserviceable) or recorded by the FARDC Base Logistique Centrale and integrated in the national stockpile.

- Despite the relatively limited number of weapons collected and the CNC-ALPC’s limited capacity to extend the scope of its activities, the voluntary disarmament programmes have proved successful, particularly with regard to the positive example they have set in terms of cooperation among national authorities, local communities and civil society stakeholders.

- Should the DRC find ways to overcome the logistical and capacity-related shortages they were experiencing as of August 2016, further initiatives and results could be gained in this area. As of August 2016, support was needed for the CNC-ALPC in reinforcing its presence and operational ability at the regional and provincial levels. Moreover, the DRC may wish to seek international support for collection programmes by linking this activity to broader security contexts, including border controls. Further, the DRC is encouraged to link the collection programme to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in particular Target 16.4 to significantly reduce the illicit flow of arms. Such a link would help place the emphasis on community disarmament as a form of post-conflict reconstruction, contributing to the establishment of a favourable environment for sustained peace and socio-economic development.

**OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short term</th>
<th>Medium term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reinforce civil society and representative groups’ (women, youth, specific professional categories, etc.) involvement in research and surveys which pave the way for collection programmes</td>
<td>Align the CNC-ALPC’s projects, priorities and timelines with those of international donors providing assistance to make for a better and more fruitful relationship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TECHNICAL PILLAR II: OTHER RELEVANT THEMATIC AREAS - AWARENESS-RAISING AND STUDIES**

**KEY FINDINGS**

- Due to time constraints and practical challenges, some of the DRC security agencies (i.e. Customs, the National Intelligence Agency, among others) were not present during the consultations held in August 2016. As these entities are equipped with weapons and ammunition, their involvement in future CNC-ALPC activities and consultations would certainly be valuable. The involvement of the aforementioned entities could also help move the CNC-ALPC’s focus to some of the thematic areas which were only partially addressed (or fully unaddressed), such as border management and controls, cross-border flows, transit and trans-shipment of weapons and ammunition.
OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

45. Continue efforts to raise awareness at a high-level and with communities (including at the primary school level), including the dissemination of laws

46. Conduct and/or support studies and surveys on the perception of armed violence, the circulation of weapons, the cultural dimensions of weapons possession and other relevant matters, and strengthen cooperation with academic circles as much as possible
The exchange of good practices and lessons learned in strengthening WAM policy and practice in Africa seeks to enhance the knowledge of States, regional organisations and international partners on ways to establish and implement comprehensive national and regional frameworks governing the full lifecycle of arms and ammunition.

This publication presents a holistic approach to weapons and ammunition management with a special focus on the DRC. This holistic approach to WAM contributes to achieving broader peace, security, and development goals including but not limited to conflict prevention, armed violence reduction, an accountable security sector, the protection of civilians and advancing the Agenda 2030.

UNIDIR encourages the Community of States, regional organisations and relevant international partners to examine the options suggested for enhancing WAM in each Country Insight and use them as a basis to inform the planning, implementation, and assessment of future WAM projects in the relevant country.

About UNIDIR

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community to develop the practical, innovative ideas needed to find solutions to critical security problems.

Acknowledgements: UNIDIR would like to express its appreciation to the Government of the DRC for its facilitation and cooperation for the baseline assessment project.

Original report: Claudio Gramizzi (Conflict Armament Research), Hardy Giezendanner & Daniel Golston

WAM baseline assessment expert team: Himayu Shiotani, Claudio Gramizzi & Hardy Giezendanner

Edited by: Manuel Martinez Miralles, Anna Mensah, Natalie Briggs & Erica Mumford

Design & layout: Eric M Schulz & Kathryn Paletta